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Why should I trust CueCrux?

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Why should I trust CueCrux?

You should not have to: every claim it makes checks out offline

The honest answer is that you should not have to trust CueCrux, and the product is built so that you do not.

Every state mutation the daemon performs is recorded as a CROWN receipt, signed with Ed25519 and hash-chained on a BLAKE3 append-only spine. Altering or removing a record breaks the chain in a way any verifier can detect. You can check your own store at any time with corecruxctl verify-store, and the export path is designed for scrutiny: export a context, verify it offline, and confirm that a tampered export is rejected. That tamper-rejection path is exercised as a release-blocking CI gate, not a demo.

There are no anonymous writes. Every connection binds to a passport, every tool call carries it, and any receipt resolves back to who acted, at what tier, under which grants. When policy says no, the refusal itself fails closed and leaves a signed RefusalReceipt with a reason code, so even the things that did not happen are on the record.

None of this requires a hosted service, an account, or a support ticket. Verification works offline, on your hardware, against your own store. Trust in CueCrux is not a claim we make; it is a property you can check.